IS FRONT-OFFICE OUTSOURCING POSSIBLE? Reply

In a word – Yes. Although it is probably not possible to outsource an entire front office capability it is possible to outsource key elements so that the capability is (i) better supported, and (ii) more effective.

OUTSOURCING TEENAGE PREGNANCY

In a particular UK outsourcing company the account manager of a Local Government account in a in a poor area once asked the CEO of the Council if he felt that more IT would help him. The CEO snapped back that unless the account manager could solve teenage pregnancy with his IT then to stop bothering him! The question remained: could we help reduce teenage pregnancy through the use of our services? At the time no single process or set of processes existed which was particularly focused on the reduction of teenage pregnancy. Social workers merely had a bag of blunt tools which they applied on a case by case basis, usually after the fact (or in cases of extreme and obvious risk).

It would be ambitious. The area in question had the UK’s youngest grandmother. She was 28. Many young girls saw their only way out of the poverty cycle was by falling pregnant in order to get a council house and benefits. Regardless of the social problems this causes the sheer drain on the public purse is immense.

On an investigative trip to India where the outsourcing delivery partners were visited the Use Case was put to them. 3 areas were focussed on:

  • Analytics. Analysing and correlating large volumes of data is key. This is not something that social services did nor could they do. Analysis would not only require the infrastructure but it would also need the personnel to input and interpret the output.
  • Security. Data security and anonymity is critical. Employing local people was a key differentiator of the vendor and sending personal data offshore would be sensitive. Data would need to be cleaned, anonymised and then transmitted. Only when analyses were made and returned would results be matched with identifying indicators.
  • Reporting. Reporting needs to be intelligent and intuitive. The analysis could not spit out typed reports but rather would need to target social workers directly and inform them of specific risks and link the risks to benefits, programs, policies and guidance in and around the entire area.

CONTRACTING FOR COMPLEXITY

Being part of such a complex capability would be very daunting for a business. Outsourcing vendors typically eschew complexity. Profit is based not only on an economy of scale but also on lower pay-band workers performing the tasks (typically in countries where labour is cheaper). Any increase in complexity adds the need for managerial oversight which adds the indirect (non-chargeable) costs of higher pay-band workers. Complexity is not good.

In order to avoid this in front-office outsourcing the vendor needs to get the customer to perform service orchestration. This is where the customer performs the oversight and configures the services as they wish. This does not mean that the vendor is just crunching numbers in the background. Rather, the vendor provides a level of human interpretation on the analysis as well as feeding them back into a vendor rep in the social services environment who can then ‘push’ the information. This last part is essential because the vendor is likely only to be financially incentivised on the basis of lower teenage pregnancy. Dealing with public service apathy and stagnant processes at a personal level is critical.

LEGAL LIABILITY

What if it goes wrong? Vendors are now part of vulnerable people’s lives. If something goes wrong who carries the liability? Should the vendor provide warranties for the services? Or simply guarantee results year by year? These areas are untested. However, it is likely that vendors will only warrant the technical aspects of the services which is not really front-office outsourcing. One way around this is to ‘own’ a number of key roles or at least the role specification. In this way they can realistically provide warranties for some of the outcomes.

In the end, front-office outsourcing is not only possible but it will be increasingly necessary in the future in order to provide vendors with the differentiators necessary to maintain profits. The most critical issues will be getting vendors to deal with complexity without paying too much for the additional risk and in a way which allows them to take on the overall liability as well. The front office is a prime source of differentiation but it can be ground captured by outsourcers so long as they are smart about both complexity and liability.

CONTRACTING FOR CAPABILITY: the future of outsourcing Reply

Outsourcing only works for vendors. It does not work for customers. Revenue curves for vendors show a slight increase since 2008 for global outsourcing growth but the picture is less clear for customers. When looking at the economic-value-added (EVA) for businesses before and after outsourcing deals most show a nett decrease, which is to say only that they are weaker after the deal but not necessarily because of it.

The reasons are myriad however there are a few standard reasons:

  1. outsourcing is usually part of cost reduction activities of panicking organisations.
  2. there is usually a nett decrease in headcount which wipes out the value-added aspects of reduced costs.
  3. the customer’s SG&A costs usually rise due to the increased management activity needed in finding and using information.

Due to these reasons there is a feeling in the market that outsourcing does not work despite the claims of vendors. Therefore, vendors have increasingly (certainly since 2007) seen themselves fighting for an ever shrinking slice of the economic pie. The greatest sources of competitive advantage have been reputations and economies of scale. All, however, have been scrambling for a differentiator that does not involve reducing their own profits.

MIDDLE-OFFICE OUTSOURCING

One large UK outsourcing outfit saw the writing on the wall. It felt that it would not be able to compete with the lower labour (and similar outputs) of India-based companies. It rationalised that eventually it would be squeezed out of the back-office (i.e. highly standardised financial processes) outsourcing and infrastructure hosting markets. It would, it rationalised, need to move into middle-office outsourcing. Front-office outsourcing, on the other hand, is largely fictional as it encompasses the customer-facing aspects of a business which is where the key differentiators are.

Middle-office outsourcing (such as a council planning approvals process) is unique because it involves less repetitive processes and sometimes ad hoc activities.  Success here is necessarily predicated on a flexible IT infrastructures (often service-based, i.e. SOA) and a sophisticated management which is able to choreograph technology-based processes and services.

COMMERCIAL CAPABILITIES

Being able to outsource the middle-office involves positioning the vendor into a customer’s capability. A capability is the ensemble of systems, processes, people and information/data necessary to do something. In business terms this means all the stuff that is necessary to perform a process. Technically, capabilities are specifications of an enterprise’s Value Chain, so in broad terms a business will have about 20-ish key capabilities. All capabilities are, necessarily, linked. The closer one gets to the front-office the more these capabilities need to (i) be performed and supported in real-time, and (ii) they also need to consume information and services from elsewhere in the business. For instance, in our planning approvals process example the vendor will have to (a) log approvals in real-time, (b) consume up to date information on structures and utilities, as well as (c) access information on business rules (i.e. council policy, governance, law etc). As with any outsourcing activity, more narrowly focused personnel on lower pay bands are used to perform tasks more ably supported by better technology. All these aspects not only add to the complexity (and therefore the price) but also to the potential liability. When offering low pay band workers to crank the handle on repetitive processes liability is something a vendor wishes assiduously to avoid.

DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

Capability is a term much abused but little understood in Defence circles. Much of this is because Defence does not use a standard value chain. Although there is a business model for most western Defence communities (Inform > Project > Operate etc) there is no need for a value chain because there is (i) no need to differentiate, and (ii) planning and financing is based on the use of ‘unlimited’ funds to confront external threats (i.e. Treasury tends to play second fiddle during war).

The military user will often class themselves as a ‘special’ customer. The defence industrial complex is a special environment for the simple reason that they are providing equipment which – if the enemy is successful – is useless to the customer by the time it enters service. Unlike the commercial enterprise, where such a situation would mean they lost some competitive advantage/margin, in the military such a situation is untenable. The purpose of a military capability is therefore to change quickly and radically over time in line with the threat. Corporate structures are notoriously incapable of maintaining the same tempo of development, even with lavish operational funding. The purpose of ‘Contracting for Capability’ is to solve the problem of commercial-lag whilst still providing a cost effective and commercially robust means of contracting.

THE CONTRACT: A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM

This is possible by viewing the capability environment as a complex evolving system which requires the commercial deal to be a complex adaptive system. This is not new to the law. Building and construction deals have been taking this approach for years and German franchising law has excellent precedents showing how risk may be judicially assessed throughout a large, distributed network of commercial entities – for a common purpose or effect.

Figure 1 – Shows how commercial deals fail to keep pace with and support military capabilities.

‘ROLES’ – The Key to Capability

The key difference between commercial and military capability is that in the military environment the vendor cannot own the people. In business, the customer will transfer the roles over to the vendor. In the military equivalents of the middle and front offices (i.e. front line and forward echelons) the vendor will never own the people. Soldiers will always perform critical tasks. This will remain a constant for some time to come as soldiers do not say (i) “the computer isn’t working”, or (ii) “do I get overtime?” etc.

Although a vendor cannot own the people it can own the ‘Role’ or the role specification, i.e. the processes, information and systems that a role uses. In this way, a vendor can support the core functions of a role without hindering the actual person’s ability to go outside the boundaries of that specification to ensure that something is done. For instance, a aeromedical evacuation must take place regardless of whether a computer is not working. The airman performing the tasking may have at their disposal a sophisticated orchestration of processes based on flight availabilities, supporting gunships, bed availability and surgeons on duty. However, if the network is down it is unacceptable to let a soldier die just because the computers are not working. That airman must now use their deep knowledge to work the radios and help save a life. On the other hand the military is largely incapable (and unwilling) to integrate the vast array of ICT necessary to develop the initial systems.

Figure 2 – ‘Contracting for Capability’ using commercial communities to support capability clusters.

COMPLEX CAPABILITY

The example of an aeromed evacuation is somewhat simplistic. The example above refers to the Deep Target Attack capability. This capability may be performed by submarine/ship-launched missile strike, aircraft or even Special Forces. The choice is a military judgement. In the case of a submarine launched method the enemy will try to prevent this through anti-submarine naval activity (ASW). The submarine needs to close to striking distance, reach launch depth and then withdraw safely. How is it possible to support such a process which involves very long and expensive R&D lead times, long into-service acceptance testing, new training and tight export controls as well as restrictions on the use and sharing of sensitive information?

The trick is to incentivise the commercial community to do some of the thinking for the military. Instead of having to wade through the commercial treacle of Defence procurement the following steps could be taken:

  1. Base contracts on Capability Increments. In this way, the vendor is obliged to keep pace with threat evolution and the development of capabilities.
  2. Outsource the Role Specification. This will ensure that the military community is forced to involve its commercial delivery partners (without being hamstrung by systems).
  3. Create Commercial Communities around the support to certain key systems/clusters of technology. This is similar to German franchise systems whereby all parties are legally obliged to discharge their contractual obligations in line with a common purpose. This will circumvent the horrific impasses usually experienced in alliance contracts.

Contracting For Capability is a logically sensible concept which simply builds upon the work already achieved in the Enterprise Architecture community (especially MoDAF, MoDEM and the IDEAS Group). It is not overly complex nor is it a step too far. Once again, the real question is whether Defence and industry have the sophistication and diligence to complete the task.

The Customer Always Pays for Risk: risk allocation in large and complex contracts Reply

A recent report in The Australian (17/12/13) newspaper into the Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) debacle states that the project is already $106M of its $618M budget for 2012-13 (a wastage of over $2M a week). The article states that the project delays are a combination of “shipbuilding bungles, infighting between partners, Defence budget cuts and a cultural clash with the ship’s Spanish designer, Navantia.” Poor efficiencies at the ASC in Adelaide and little coherence in the support phase are also contributing to the mess but the AWD Alliance still maintains it is on track because its emergency funds have not been exhausted.

The AWD Alliance is the “unwieldy and largely unaccountable” body responsible for the AWD project. The alliance is made up of ASC, the Defence Materiel Organisation and Raytheon Australia. The “secretive” alliance is apparently fractured by internal disputes, with the DMO blaming the ASC. The ASC, in turn, blames Navantia. Further still, the ASC is also blighted by a “poisonous” relationship with its primary subcontractor, BAE Systems.

This is a contracting issue:

  1. There is no issue with the Spanish design. This design was picked as part of a strict and comprehensive procurement process. If the ASC did not perform the requisite due diligence on the engineering then it should not be in the game of building ships.
  2. In multi-party construction contracts poor site efficiencies are largely a result of (i) cumbersome management, and (ii) poor depth of vision into the total supply chain. Both issues should have been obvious and ironed out at the contracting stage.
  3. There is no doubt that budget cuts and legislative change pose a high degree of risk. However, if the revenue curve of the corporate entities were subject to ill winds from Canberra then those teams did not do their jobs.
  4. Lastly, if a project is eating its emergency/contingency funds then it is an emergency and it is definitely not on track.

So, what’s wrong with Alliance contracting?

John Cooper, writing in the journal of Building & Construction Law (2009 25 BCL 372) notes that alliance contracting is increasingly popular in Australia. Promoted by contractors and adopted by some state governments it is seen as a way to overcome the problems said to be associated with “more traditional forms of contracting”. From this I assume he is including PPP contracts and their PFI/PF2 subset.

Alliance contracts are supposed to be more conducive to collegial management and better outcomes because:

  1. They are governed by a charter of principles and not the black letters of a strict contract.
  2. Each party (theoretically) operates in good faith (although, unlike German franchise law, not necessarily to the mutual benefit of the project).
  3. There is an understanding of “collective responsibility”
  4. There is a socially enforceable culture of “no-blame, no dispute”.

In fact, all of these points are patent nonsense and the article in The Australian and the Australian National Audit Office report on the same project clearly highlight the complete ineffectiveness of an Alliance contract in this instance.

At the heart of the problem is the risk model. Alliance contracts are popular for Defence because (i) the government underwrites the requirements risk (i.e. future requirements creep), and (ii) they do not have to expose this as an additional cost. So, the project appears to be good value for money. In fact, DMO is to blame here because it knows that it would never be able to get the AWD it wanted if it had to expose/pay for the risk. This is standard Defence sharp practice and to my mind borderline procurement fraud. By getting the government to underwrite the risk the DMO ends up getting the ship it wants at a bargain price. It ends up paying way over the odds but the project would never have been approved if the risk had been exposed. The price would simply have been too high.

In a standard construction contract the client would not underwrite future risk. So, the builder would cover this through (a) additional systems engineering to uncover and cost future dependencies, (b) they would insure against certain risks, and (c) they would then add this into the cost model, i.e. the customer would end up buying the risk back. In the end, the customer always pays for risk. Even if the builder has to absorb hefty liquidated damages for lateness the customer will still pay for them down the line in more aggressive management practices or exorbitant extension-of-time claims and even larger margins on acceleration costs. The customer always pays for risk.

NETWORK RISK

The primary cause of these problems is an unsophisticated and uneducated approach to contracting. Underlying these is the simple fact that risk cannot be allocated if the allocatee does not endorse the allocation. In fact, I would posit that risk cannot be allocated at all. Risk must be bought and sold in order for (i) a party to be truly incentivised to deal with risk, and (ii) the risk to go away. The last point is critical. In standard risk flow-down models risk never goes away. Rather, it simply flows down to the party with the least bargaining power to offload it. In the end, the customer always buys the risk back. In a network model, risk is sold to the party who wants it the most. In the end, they absorb the cost (or a certain percentage) based on the value they will reap in the event the risk is realised.

For instance, the network model below at Figure 1 is based on a large outsourcing contract. A multi-divisional outsourcing company won a contract to deliver products and services to a government body. Part of that contract was the hosting of IT infrastructure, a portal for public access and a billing application. The latter of which was being coded from scratch. In this model, the risk that the code for the billing application is held in escrow and the risk that the billing application will not be ready or fit for purpose (significant) is sold (i.e. the contingent risk) to another company in the model. In this way:

  • the purchaser of the risk get a (partially finished) billing application at a knock-down price (if the risk is realised).
  • the primary outsourcer can simply pass the application on to the former without having to find a suitable programmer in mid-flight, and therefore
  • the primary outsourcer does not need to insure this risk (so much), and
  • the original application company are greatly incentivised, lest they lose their R&D costs.

Additional vehicles (other than escrow) for contingent risk may be:

  • Step-In Rights
  • Holding other titles and licenses in escrow
  • contingent transfers of other property.

In all the cases something happens automatically. There is no better way to make this happen than for someone to profit from another’s poor performance. In such cases, the vampiric action of the vestee is swift justice for sub-standard management. When risk is realised, the vestee swoops and kills. There can be no greater motivation for either party. The primary question is whether a business has enough faith in its management to set up contracts in this way. Although a network model of risk is, technically, the best means to manage risk in large and complex contracts the businesses need to decide whether they have the management sophistication and the stomach to deal with risk in this way.

Figure 1 – Model of “Derived Risk” in a large outsourcing contract.

Hidden Costs in ICT Outsourcing Contracts Reply

hidden-costs

Why are IT outsourcing contracts almost always delivered over-budget and over-schedule?  Why do IT outsourcing contracts almost always fail to achieve their planned value? How come IT contracts seem to be afflicted with this curse more than any other area?

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The common answer is that (i) the requirements change,  and (ii) that handovers from the pre-contractual phase to in-service management are always done poorly.  These are both true although hardly explain the complexity of the situation.  If requirements change were an issue then freezing requirements would solve it – it doesn’t.  The complexity of large ICT projects is derived directly from the fact that not all the requirements are even knowable from the outset.  This high level of unknown-unknowns, coupled with the inherent interdependence of business and system requirements, means that requirements creep is not only likely but inevitable.  Secondly, (ii) handover issues should be able to be solved by unpicking the architecture and going back to the issue points.  This too is never so simple.  My own research has shown that the problem is not in the handover but that the subtleties and complexities of the project architecture is not usually pulled through into the management and delivery structures.  Simply put, it is one thing to design an elegant IT architecture.  It is another thing entirely to design it to be managed well over a number of years.  Such management requires a range of new elements and concepts that never exist in architectural design.

The primary factor contributing to excessive cost (including from schedule overrun) is poor financial modelling.  Simply put, the hidden costs were never uncovered in the first place.  Most cost models are developed by finance teams and uncover the hard costs of the project.  There are, overall however, a total of 3 cost areas which must be addressed in order to determine the true cost of it outsourcing. 

True Cost of IT

1.  Hard costs.  This is the easy stuff to count; the tangibles.  These are the standard costs, the costs of licensing, hardware, software etc.  It is not just the obvious but also includes change management (communications and training).  The Purchasor of the services should be very careful to build the most comprehensive cost model based on a detailed breakdown of the project structure, ensuring that all the relevant teams input costing details as appropriate.

2.  Soft Costs.  The construction industry, for instance, has been building things for over 10,000 years.  With this level of maturity one would imagine that soft costs would be well understood.  They are not.  With project costs in an extremely mature sector often spiralling out of proportion it is easy to see that this might also afflict the technology sector which is wildly different almost from year to year. 

Soft costs deal with the stuff that is difficult to cost; the intangibles:  The cost of information as well as process and transaction costs.  These costs are largely determined by the ratio of revenue (or budget in terms of government departments) against the Sales, General & Administration costs, i.e. the value of the use of information towards the business.  Note that this information is not already counted in the cost-of-goods-sold for specific transactions.

Soft costs go to the very heart of how a business/government department manages its information.  Are processes performed by workers on high pay-bands?  Are workflows long and convoluted?  The answers to these questions have an exponential effect on the cost of doing business in an information-centric organisation.  Indeed, even though the cost of computing hardware is decreasing, the real cost of information work – labour – is increasing.  This is not just a function of indexed costs but also the advent of increasing accreditation and institutionalisation in the knowledge worker community.  Firstly, there is greater tertiary education for knowledge work which has hitherto been unaccounted for or part of an external function.  The rise of the Business Analyst, the Enterprise Architect (and a plethora of other “architects”) all serve to drive delivery costs much higher.  Not only are the costs of this labour increasing but the labour is now institutionalised, i.e. its place and value is not questioned – despite the data showing there seems to be limited economic value added through these services (i.e. no great improvement in industry delivery costs).

3.  Project Costs.  Projects are never delivered according to plan.  Requirements are interpreted differently, the cohesion of the stakeholder team can adversely impact the management of the project, even the sheer size and complexity of the project can baffle and bewilder the most competent of teams.  Supply chain visibility, complicated security implementations and difficult management structures all add to project friction and management drag.  There are many more factors which may have an adverse or favourable effect on the cost of performing projects. 

IT Transition Cost Graph

In the Defence community, Ph.D student Ricardo Valerdi created a cost model – COSYSMO – which isolated 14 separate factors peculiar to systems engineering projects  and gave these factors cost coefficients in a cost model.  Ultimately, each factor may be scored and the scoring then determines the effort multiplier, usually a number between approximately 0.6 and 1.8.  Naturally, when all factors are taken into account the overall effect on the contract price is significant. 

More importantly, for IT implementations, the “project” is not short.  IT outsourcing projects are generally split into 2 phases:  Transition and Transformation.  Transition involves what outsourcers call “shift-and-lift” or the removal of the data centres from the customer site and rear-basing or disposal of the hardware which allows the company to realise significant cost savings on office space. 

During the second phase – Transformation – the business seeks to realise the financial benefits of outsourcing.  Here, a myriad of small projects are set about in order to change the way a business operates and thereby realise the cost benefits of computer-based work, i.e. faster processes from a reduced headcount and better processes which are performed by workers on a lower pay-band. 

IT outsourcing  is not just about the boxes and wires.  It involves all the systems, hard and soft, the people, processes and data which enable the business to derive value from its information.  Just finding all of these moving parts is a difficult task let alone throwing the whole bag of machinery over the fence to an outsourcing provider.   To continue the metaphor, if the linkages between the Purchasor and the Vendor are not maintained then the business will not work.  More importantly, certain elements will need to be rebuilt on the Purchasor’s side of this metaphorical fence, thus only serving to increase costs overall.  The financial modelling which takes into account all of these people, processes and systems must, therefore, be exceptional if an outsourcing deal is to survive.

Qld Govt On Track to lose Billions Through Poor Outsourcing Reply

In a recent article in online technology ezine Delimiter – “Qld Health Preps Huge IT Outsourcing Deals” – Renai LeMay points out that the Qld government will need to spend an unadjusted $7.4 billion over the next 5 years in order to replace and upgrade 90% of its outdated ICT portfolio.

The question is whether it has learnt from the Qld Health outsourcing debacle with IBM and will it move forward with its best foot?  It is unlikely, given that HSIA seems thrust into the contracting process too early with too little.  With the pace seemed to be set by the Costello audit, the HSIA is now engaging in early vendor ‘discussions’ (IBM notably excluded) without even a detailed set of business requirements, system parameters and financial boundaries.

In letting vendors shape the early development of these outsourcing contracts the government is on track to lose billions.  This will happen for 3 primary reasons:

  1. Service Management will be overlooked – The failure of virtually all contracts is not in the structure but the management.  Although most experienced litigators have gasped at contracts (usually government) which seemed to have been designed to fail (largely due to something bordering on corruption or undue influence), most are not so designed.  Outsourcing contracts, more than any other, require detailed attention to the management of the service.  Ultimately, the difficulty lies in the paradigm shift from network support to service management.  In other words, the personnel in charge of servicing are now in charge of service management.  In most cases, these jobs are made redundant as the vendor takes them over (unlike TUPE laws in the UK).  Consequently, the knowledge is lost.  Purchasors can protect themselves against service decline by making the vendor buy key personnel.  Better yet, Purchasors should transition these key roles from performing the work to managing the service/contract.
  2. Deals will be too long – Vendors will push longer outsourcing contract lifecycles.  Although, prima facie, there is  nothing long with a long contract it is imperative that such contracts are designed to be managed, i.e. the focus is on the delivery and management Schedules and not the boilerplate of the Operational clauses.
  3. Tech bundles will lack modularity – Qld government loves to re-organise.  After each government their is always a paradigm shift in the Machinery of Government (MOG).  Departments shift and with them so do budgets and internal processes.  These are generally managed within departmental parameters with necessary roles and functions often going unfunded and unfilled for entire cycles of  government.  To reinforce Renai LeMay’s point, it goes without saying, therefore, that the government needs to develop a modular, multi-bundle architecture wherein departments can buy and sell service credits between themselves without limiting the overall strategic cost savings.

In summ, there are numerous ways in which Qld government can guard against the inevitability of cost overruns and poor, overly simplistic outsourcing contracts.  On the other hand, the vendor which offers these first will have a significant advantage.  in many cases, the difficulty will be in convincing QGCPO that novel and innovative contracting vehicles are there for the benefit of the Purchasor and not just vendor voodoo. 

CIOs warned against long outsourcing contracts Reply

In a recent article in online magazine IT News, government CIOs are actively warned against signing long term service deals.  Mike Lafford, from Gartner, advises government CIOs against long term contracts. 

Please, please, please, don’t sign ten year deals.
– Mike Lafford, Gartner

Logic favours a longer contract in order to squeeze more value for money from a vendor by allowing them greater economies of scale (i.e. more guaranteed revenue = more borrowing power = bigger, better service infrastructure).   However, Mr Lafford notes that the contracting process is so long and tedious that vendors artificially force up their margins to cover the enormous costs of business development and tendering.  Government departments, therefore in particular, do not see cost benefits.

Current outsourcing contracts show a level of sharp practice and degree of innovation usually reserved for used car sales

Lafford, however, does concede that there are 3 artificial factors which increase both the risk and costs for vendors, namely:

  1. Transition Costs are High – Departments  are told they place an unusually high management burden on vendors by ‘creeping’ into contracts.  Long evaluation periods and bespoke management structures all serve to drive up vendor costs.  Purchasors should align their management structures with the, relatively, inflexible service delivery of the vendors.  In addition they can give the vendor a 3-6 month Service Credit holiday  with a Buy-Back/Call Option at the en.  In this situation all current infrastructure remains in place and the Buy-Back option (purchase for the base cost of transition) is contingent on a stipulated average service performance level well below market benchmarks.
  2. Vendor Risk in Technology/Business Change – Primary risk is derived from reduced volume/numbers, e.g. in desktop support.  There are 2 possible ways to deal with this:  (i)  sign a deal involving multiple departments.  Hedge overflow costs buy buying and selling capacity amongst departments/teams.  Secondly, (ii) pay for the minimum not the maximum and then buy overflow capacity.  Departments and teams are always looking at headcount reduction so don’t buy at your maximum capacity but do expect/ensure good discounts (on an increasing scale) for more capacity.
  3. Inflexibility in Contracts – The current thesis is that long contracts are inflexible contracts.  This is nonsense, although technology contracts can be far more complex than PPP contracts, for instance, for the reasons stated above, i.e. lack of clarity in the future requirements.   The focus of most contracts is on the ‘operational clauses’, i.e. boilerplate governing standard business relationships.  Failure of outsourcing contracts, however, is almost always with the failure of contract management (by which we usually mean “service management”).  In order to develop a contract which changes over time, the focus of the contract must be in the Service Management Schedules. 

In summ, governments and businesses alike have to realise that someone pays for risk.  If they place risk with the vendor then the business/department ultimately buys it back.  To that end, I would usually recommend a 5+5 contract.  The trick, however, is not with the development of the KPIs but rather with the management of the service.  To that end, Purchasors should not underestimate the detail they need to go in to when developing their service management structure.